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Abstract: As agent technology is expected to become a possible base platform for
an electronic services framework, especially in the area of Electronic Commerce, re-
liable security protection is a crucial aspect, since some transactions in this area might
involve confidential information, such as credit card number, bank account informa-
tion or some form of digital cash, that has value and might therefore be attacked.
In addition, without proper and reliable security protection, the wide spread use of
agent technology in real world applications could be impeded. In this paper, evalu-
ation of the Recorded State Mechanism (RSM) previously proposed by the authors
is presented. The evaluation examines the RSM security protection and implemen-
tation overhead, in order to analyse the RSM security strength and implementation
feasibility in real world application.
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1 Introduction
Problem in agent technology arise when agents are used in an open and unsecured environment.
For example, a customised agent application is sent out to visit several airline servers (in an open and
unsecured environment) to find a suitable flight. In this example, the agent application is allowed to
completely migrate to (the agent originating host transfer the agent’s code, data and state to the remote
server) and execute in (the remote server executed the receiving agent application) the remote server
environment, to take advantage of exploiting resource near the data source and thus reducing network
traffic [20]. This opens a greater opportunity for the agent application to be abused by the executing host,
because the agent application is fully under control of the executing host [10, 19].
An example of attack by the executing host (the malicious host) is to tamper with the agent’s data or
state, so that the agent will forget all the previous visits and offers held by the agent, and thus force the
agent (application) to accept an offer from the malicious host even though the malicious host’s offer is
not the best offer [10, 17, 19]. This kind of attack is known as a manipulation attack [11, 10]. In this
attack, the owner of the agent may not know the attack has happened. This is because the malicious host
may make subtle changes in the agent’s code, data and state, which are difficult to detect, thus enabling
the malicious host to achieve its objective. In addition, the agent (application) that returns from the
malicious host does not show any different behaviour from an untampered agent, which makes the attack
difficult to detect and prevent.
The problem of manipulation attack has been addressed by the authors using the Recorded State
Mechanism (RSM) [1, 2]. The RSM uses the state of an agent, which is recorded during the agent
execution process inside an execution host environment to detect the malicious host manipulation attack.
In this paper the evaluation of the Recorded State Mechanism is presented. The evaluation analyse the
RSM’s security and overhead its feasibility in real world applications.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the evaluation of the Recorded State Mecha-
nism, which includes the analysis on the security and implementation overhead of the RSM. Section 3
presents a discussion and the conclusion is presented in section 4.
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2 The Evaluation of the Recorded State Mechanism
The Recorded State Mechanism is an integrity protection mechanism that is able to detect manipu-
lation attacks from a malicious host. The mechanism consists of three different types of container, the
RecordedReadOnly, RecordedExecuteOnly and RecordedCollectOnly that are used to record the agent
state information. This recorded agent state information, which consists of the data of the agent (located
in its variables) and the execution information (such as the program counter, the call stack and a few
more items) is used for detecting any modification attacks from the malicious host in order to protect the
integrity of the agent during agent execution inside the malicious host environment.
The evaluation of the Recorded State Mechanism is presented by examines the RSM security protec-
tion and implementation overhead that will be discussed in the next section.
2.1 The Security Analysis of the Recorded State Mechanism
To assess the strength of the Recorded State Mechanism, its ability to handle well-known attacks is
discussed in Table 1.
Summary of evaluation of Recorded State Mechanism
The Recorded State Mechanism is able to detect most of the malicious host attacks that try to tamper
with the agent’s data and state integrity. This mechanism when combined with distributed migration
pattern, can prevent collaboration attacks by two or more hosts and extraction of information by the
malicious host. However attacks such as an execution host lying about input data cannot be detected or
prevented by this mechanism, because the attack does not alter any state information, and so leaves no
trace.
2.2 The Overhead of Implementing the Recorded State Mechanism
The experiments to measure the overhead of implementing the Recorded State Mechanism are con-
ducted using six 400 MHz Sun Ultra Sparc 5 workstations with 128 MB of main memory. Each of the
workstations is running the Solaris 8 operating system and is connected to the others using 100 Mbit/s
UTP1 cable. All of the workstations involved in this experiment were situated in the same room.
In this configuration, one workstation will be chosen among the six workstations to be the home host
for the agent, and only this host has the permission to manage and dispatch the agent. The rest of the
workstations are assumed to be the remote host, having only the capability to receive and dispatch the
agent back to its home host.
To evaluate the security overhead for implementing the Recorded State Mechanism in an agent-
based application, times are measured starting from sending of the agents to the remote hosts and
ending by receiving the agents back from the remote hosts. The times, are measured using the “Sys-
tem.currentTimeMillis()” method in the Java language. This method produces a specific instant in time
with millisecond precision [14].
The experiments are done using four different remote host starting with one remote host, two remote
hosts, three remote hosts and five remote hosts on three different types of agent: plain agent2, agent with
cryptographic security mechanism (Crypto) and agent with these security mechanisms and the recorded
state mechanism (Crypto+RSM). There are four different experiments used in examining the overhead
for implementing the Recorded State Mechanism: one input and one cycle, one hundred inputs and one
cycle, one input and one thousand cycles, and one hundred inputs and one thousand cycles. The input is
1Unshielded Twisted Pair Category 5e
2agents without security mechanisms
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A t t a c k s  S o l u t i o n s  
 
T h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  c o u l d  m a k e  s u b t l e  c h a n g e s  o n  r e a d - o n l y  d a t a  
i n s i d e  t h e  R e c o r d e d R e a d O n l y  c o n t a i n e r  t o  e n a b l e  i t  t o  a c h i e v e  i t s  
o b j e c t i v e ,  i n  s u c h  a  w a y  t h a t  t h e  o w n e r ' s  d i g i t a l  s i g n a t u r e  t h a t  w a s  
s i g n e d  i n  t h e  R e c o r d e d R e a d O n l y  c o n t a i n e r  s t i l l  r e m a i n s  v a l i d .  
 
T h i s  a t t a c k  c a n  b e  r u l e d  o u t ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  d i g i t a l  s i g n a t u r e  ( u s i n g  
S H A 1 ) ,  w h i c h  i s  u s e d  i n  t h e  R e c o r d e d  S t a t e  m e c h a n i s m  i s  
s e c u r e d  a g a i n s t  b r u t e - f o r c e  c o l l i s i o n  a n d  i n v e r s i o n  a t t a c k s ,  
w h e r e  b y  u s i n g  t h e  S H A 1  a s  t h e  d i g i t a l  s i g n a t u r e  f u n c t i o n  c o u l d  
m a k e  t h e  a t t a c k e r  c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y  i n f e a s i b l e  t o  f i n d  a  m e s s a g e  
w h i c h  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  a  g i v e n  m e s s a g e  d i g e s t ,  o r  t o  f i n d  t w o  
d i f f e r e n t  m e s s a g e s  w h i c h  p r o d u c e  t h e  s a m e  m e s s a g e  d i g e s t .  
 
 
T h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  c o u l d  a l s o  m a k e  s u b t l e  c h a n g e s  o n  b o t h  t h e  
r e a d - o n l y  d a t a  a n d  t h e  d i g i t a l  s i g n a t u r e  f o r  t h e  R e c o r d e d R e a d O n l y  
c o n t a i n e r ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  m a k e  b o t h  o f  t h e m  a p p e a r  t o  b e  v a l i d .  
 
 
T h i s  p o s s i b l e  a t t a c k  c a n  a l s o  b e  r u l e d  o u t  b e c a u s e  i n  o r d e r  t o  
c r e a t e  a  n e w  d i g i t a l  s i g n a t u r e  t h a t  w i l l  b e  v a l i d  f o r  o t h e r  h o s t ,  
t h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  n e e d s  t o  h a v e  a  p r i v a t e  k e y  o f  t h e  a g e n t  
o w n e r .  H o w e v e r ,  o n l y  t h e  k e y  o w n e r  h a s  t h i s  k e y  a n d  n o  o t h e r  
e n t i t y  c a n  p r o d u c e  t h i s  k e y  f r o m  a  m o d i f i e d  h a s h  v a l u e .   
 
 
T h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  c o u l d  a l s o  t a m p e r  w i t h  t h e  a g e n t  s t a t e  r e c o r d e d  
i n  t h e  R e c o r d e d E x e c u t e O n l y  a n d  R e c o r d e d C o l l e c t O n l y  c o n t a i n e r  
b y  m o d i f y i n g  t h e  a g e n t  s t a t e  b e f o r e  t h e  s t a t e  i s  r e c o r d e d  i n t o  b o t h  
c o n t a i n e r s .  T h i s  d u e  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  r e c o r d e d  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  
R e c o r d e d  S t a t e  M e c h a n i s m  i s  u n d e r  t h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t ' s  c o n t r o l  
a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  c a n  d o  a n y t h i n g  t o  i t .  
 
 
T h i s  a t t a c k  c a n  a l s o  b e  r u l e d  o u t  b e c a u s e  t h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  h a s  
t o  u s e  i t s  o w n  p r i v a t e  k e y  t h a t  c o n t a i n s  i t s  i d e n t i t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  
c o m p u t e  a n d  r e - c o m p u t e  t h e  d i g i t a l  s i g n a t u r e  o n  t h e  t a m p e r e d  
s t a t e ,  t h u s  r e v e a l i n g  i t s e l f  d u r i n g  t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  p r o c e s s .  
 
 
T h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  c o u l d  a l s o  a t t a c k  t h e  a g e n t  b y  l a u n c h i n g  
c o l l a b o r a t i o n  a t t a c k s  i n  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t w o  o r  m o r e  c o n s e c u t i v e  
h o s t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e n y  t h e  c h e c k i n g  p r o c e s s  f o r  d e t e c t i n g  a n y  
m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  a t t a c k  f r o m  t h e  p r e v i o u s  v i s i t  o r  t o  r e m o v e  a n y  
a g e n t  s t a t e  t h a t  r e c o r d s  t h e  c h a n g e s  m a d e  b y  t h e  p r e v i o u s  h o s t  o n  
t h e  a g e n t  d u r i n g  i t s  e x e c u t i o n  s e s s i o n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  m a l i c i o u s  
h o s t  c o u l d  a l s o  u s e  t h e  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  a t t a c k  t o  e x t r a c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  
f r o m  t h e  a g e n t  t o  w i n  s o m e  c o m p e t i t i o n  o v e r  o t h e r  h o s t s .  
 
T h e  a t t a c k  c a n  b e  r u l e d  o u t  s i n c e  t h e  u s e d  o f  m a s t e r - s l a v e  a g e n t  
a r c h i t e c t u r e  i n  i m p l e m e n t i n g  t h e  R e c o r d e d  S t a t e  M e c h a n i s m  
o n l y  a l l o w s  d i f f e r e n t  a g e n t s  t o  b e  s e n t  a n d  s e r v e d  b y  d i f f e r e n t  
r e m o t e  h o s t s .  A n  a g e n t  v i s i t s  o n l y  o n e  h o s t ,  t h u s  p r e c l u d i n g  t h e  
c o l l a b o r a t i n g  a t t a c k .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  e x t r a c t e d  f r o m  
a  s i n g l e  a g e n t  d o e s  n o t  g i v e  e n o u g h  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  
m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  t o  a l l o w  i t  t o  w i n  a n y  c o m p e t i t i o n  o v e r  o t h e r  
h o s t s  b e c a u s e  t h e  e x t r a c t e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  b y  
i t s e l f .  
 
 
T h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  c o u l d  a l s o  l i e  a b o u t  t h e  i n p u t  d a t a ,  w h i c h  i s  
r e c o r d e d  i n  t h e  R e c o r d e d E x e c u t e O n l y  a n d  t h e  
R e c o r d e d C o l l e c t O n l y  c o n t a i n e r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e c e i v e  t h e  o w n e r  o f  
t h e  a g e n t .  
 
 
T h i s  a t t a c k  i s  u n a b l e  t o  b e  r u l e d  o u t  b y  t h e  R e c o r d e d  S t a t e  
M e c h a n i s m  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n p u t  d a t a  t h a t  w a s  s u p p l i e d  b y  t h e  
m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  i s  a s s u m e d  t o  b e  a  c o r r e c t  d a t a  b y  t h e  a g e n t ,  
s i n c e  o n l y  t h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  k n o w s  w h e t h e r  t h e  i n p u t  d a t a  i s  
c o r r e c t  o r  i n c o r r e c t .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  o w n e r  o f  t h e  a g e n t  k n o w s  t h e  
i d e n t i t y  o f  t h e  h o s t ,  w h i c h  s u p p l i e s  t h e  i n p u t  d a t a  t o  t h e  a g e n t  
b e c a u s e  a l l  t h e  d a t a  a n d  s t a t e  a r e  d i g i t a l l y  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  
e x e c u t i o n  h o s t  b e f o r e  t h e  d a t a  a n d  s t a t e  l e a v e d  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  
h o s t .  T h u s ,  t h e  o w n e r  o f  t h e  a g e n t  k n o w s  w h i c h  e x e c u t i o n  h o s t  
i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  s u p p l y i n g  t h e  f a l s e  i n p u t  d a t a .  
 
 
T h e  m a l i c i o u s  h o s t  c o u l d  a l t e r  t h e  R a n d o m  S e q u e n c e  3 - l e v e l  
o b f u s c a t i o n  a l g o r i t h m  t o  e x e c u t e  i n  m a n y  d i f f e r e n t  w a y s  ( i n c o r r e c t  
e x e c u t i o n  a t t a c k )  
 
 
T h i s  a t t a c k  c a n  b e  r u l e d  o u t  s i n c e  t h e  R e c o r d e d  S t a t e  
M e c h a n i s m  w i l l  c h e c k  t h e  r e s u l t s  g a t h e r e d  b y  t h e  r e t u r n i n g  
s l a v e  a g e n t  b y  e x e c u t i n g  t h e  s a m e  e x e c u t i o n  p r o c e s s  t h a t  i s  
a s s u m e d ,  h a s  b e e n  d o n e  b y  t h e  s l a v e  a g e n t  i n s i d e  t h e  r e m o t e  
h o s t  e x e c u t i o n  e n v i r o n m e n t .  
 
 
Table 1: Possible attacks and solutions of the Recorded State Mechanism
represents a character. This character is use as a data that need to be protected by the agent. The cycle,
on the other hand represents a loop that is used to simulate an agent tasks.
Note that all of the experiments on the Recorded State Mechanism are using master-slave agent
architecture and operates on the distributed migration pattern [1, 2].
The experiment is performed for 20 runs and the result for each run is gathered in milliseconds. From
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the author’s observation, all the 20 runs in this experiment give very similar results and for this reason,
20 runs of the experiment are considered sufficient. The average result of all the 20 runs is taken and
converted into seconds. The result is then rounded up and presented in two decimal places as given and
illustrated in Tables 2 to 5 and Figure 1 to 4 respectively.
Number of Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation
Remote Hosts Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM
1 1.54 29.15 28.91 0.003 2.18 1.23 0.01 9.73 5.52
2 2.49 30.89 31.11 0.003 2 1.38 0.02 8.93 6.19
3 3.37 31 32 0.004 0.93 0.98 0.02 4.15 4.38
5 5.35 36.36 36.03 0.011 1.5 1.87 0.05 6.7 8.37
Plain = Without Cryptographic Mechanism
Cyp (Crypto) = Cryptographic Mechanism
RSM = Recorded State Mechanism
Table 2: Summary Statistics of The Recorded State Mechanism Overhead (1 Input and 1 Cycle Experi-
ment)
S e c u r i t y  O v e r h e a d  f o r  I m p l e m e n t i n g  T h e  R e c o r d e d  






1 2 3 5







P l a i n
C y p  ( C r y p t o )
C y p + R S M
Figure 1: Security Overhead of The Recorded State Mechanism (1 Input and 1 Cycle Experiment)
Based on the observation on the results gained through the experiments done, it can be seen that the
standard error and the standard deviation of the security overhead are similar regarding the number of
remote host but different between agents. Agents with security mechanism give larger standard error
since the agents have to execute many tasks such as generate the cryptography key, generate digital
signature, verify digital signature and execute encryption and decryption.
From the results given in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 1, it can be seen that the mean of the security
overhead is almost the same for agents with security mechanism and agents with security mechanism plus
RSM, where the security overhead for the agent with security mechanism plus RSM is just 7.82 % higher
than the overhead for the agent with security mechanism. However, both agent’s security overheads are
higher by up to 1792.86 % than the overhead for the plain agent.
From Table 3 and Figure 2, the security overhead for the plain agent is almost the same as with one
input given in Table 2 and Figure 1, but the security overhead for the agents with security mechanism is
increased by up to 60.52 % along the security overhead with one input.
Results in Table 4, Table 5, Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that the security overhead for all the agents
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Number of Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation
Remote Hosts Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM
1 1.55 45.43 45.32 0.003 1.21 1.19 0.01 5.42 5.34
2 2.53 45.99 48.21 0.005 1.35 1.83 0.02 6.03 8.18
3 3.37 49.76 49.42 0.002 1.13 1.26 0.01 5.03 5.65
5 5.43 53.09 53.14 0.005 1.09 1.76 0.02 4.86 7.85
Table 3: Summary Statistics of The Recorded State Mechanism Overhead (100 Input and 1 Cycle Ex-
periment)
S e c u r i t y  O v e r h e a d  f o r  I m p l e m e n t i n g  T h e  R e c o r d e d  
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P l a i n
C y p  ( C r y p t o )
C y p + R S M
Figure 2: Security Overhead of The Recorded State Mechanism (100 Input and 1 Cycle Experiment)
is similar to the security overhead of the agents with the same number of input but different number of
cycle given in Table 2, Table 3, Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively. Therefore, it is worth noting that
number of cycles does not affect the security overhead of the agents.
Number of Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation
Remote Hosts Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM
1 2.41 27.65 28.94 0.008 0.77 1.55 0.04 3.45 6.94
2 3.53 30.91 31.31 0.008 1.38 1.68 0.04 6.18 7.53
3 5.17 30.94 33.36 0.005 1 1.04 0.02 4.46 4.65
5 7.34 38.46 37.57 0.01 1.29 1.69 0.05 5.76 7.55
Table 4: Summary Statistics of The Recorded State Mechanism Overhead (1 Input and 10000 Cycle
Experiment)
Summary of experimental results
It can be seen from the results shown in Tables 2 to 5 and illustrated in Figures 1 to 4 that the
implementation of the Recorded State Mechanism does increase the overhead by only up to an acceptable
7.82 % when compared to the agent with security mechanism but 2830.96 % when compared to the plain
agent. However, the low overhead of the plain agent is not important since the plain agent does not have
any security protection.
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S e c u r i t y  O v e r h e a d  f o r  I m p l e m e n t i n g  T h e  R e c o r d e d  
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C y p  ( C r y p t o )
C y p + R S M
Figure 3: Security Overhead of The Recorded State Mechanism (1 Input and 10000 Cycle Experiment)
Number of Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation
Remote Hosts Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM Plain Cyp Cyp+RSM
1 2.39 45.93 47.26 0.005 1.06 1.11 0.02 4.76 4.97
2 3.56 48.63 48.85 0.005 0.73 1.42 0.02 3.28 6.36
3 5.17 50.86 51.54 0.008 1.52 1.57 0.03 6.82 7.01
5 7.4 54.36 54.48 0.015 1.8 1.94 0.07 8.05 8.66
Table 5: Summary Statistics of The Recorded State Mechanism Overhead (100 Input and 10000 Cycle
Experiment)
S e c u r i t y  O v e r h e a d  f o r  I m p l e m e n t i n g  T h e  R e c o r d e d  
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P l a i n
C y p  ( C r y p t o )
C y p + R S M
Figure 4: Security Overhead of The Recorded State Mechanism (100 Input and 10000 Cycle Experiment)
3 Discussion
Integrity protection is one of the main requirements for protecting agents against a malicious host
attacks. The requirement was successfully fulfilled3 by the Recorded State Mechanism, which is able to
detect most of the malicious host attacks that try to tamper with the agent’s data and state integrity.
The analysis on security strength and implementation feasibility of the Recorded State Mechanism in
real world applications has been conducted. The security strength of the Recorded State Mechanism has
3detect or prevent some attacks and made others more difficult
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been analysed by evaluating the mechanism against well-known attack scenarios, and from the results, it
can be seen that the mechanism is capable to prevent or detect some of the attacks and made other attacks
more difficult. The implementation feasibility is measured by examining the overhead imposed by the
mechanism in protecting agents integrity against malicious host attacks. The result shows that the RSM
imposed an acceptable overhead.
4 Conclusion
This paper presented the evaluation of the Recorded State Mechanism for protecting the integrity of
the agents against the malicious host attacks. The evaluation produced significant results on the strength
of the Recorded State Mechanism, where it is able to prevent or detect some attacks and made other
attacks more difficult with an acceptable overhead. In conclusion, the mechanism offered significant
advances in protection of agents against malicious host attacks and is therefore suitable for use in real
world applications.
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